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THE QUESTIONING ATTITUDE: 
QUESTIONS ABOUT DERRIDA 
Martin Stone 
I.     AUSTIN’S NAIVETE 
 
[D]oes the quality of risk admitted by Austin surround language 
like a kind of ditch or external place of perdition which 
speech . . . can escape by remaining ‘at home’ . . . in the shelter of 
its essence or telos?  Or, on the contrary . . . [i]s that outside its 
inside, the very force and law of its emergence? 
–Derrida1 
 
Readers of Derrida will know: Everything depends on the 
thought, or the right representation of the thought, that in reading a 
text, or in our concourse with meanings generally, mistakes or 
misunderstandings are “always possible”—that they are “in some 
sense a necessary possibility” [J.D.’s emphasis].2  At least in 
Derrida’s essay on J. L. Austin, that appears to be the main issue.  
Austin is naive, according to Derrida—still unwittingly bound to a 
metaphysical tradition he wishes to escape—because, even while 
acknowledging this ubiquitous possibility of mishap (“infelicity,” 
Austin calls it), he doesn’t give it the right cast or expression.  Austin 
doesn’t “ponder,” Derrida says, the fact that a “misunderstanding” 
which is always possible can’t, for that reason, be quite the simple 
“misunderstanding”—it can’t, in opposition to “correct 
understanding” have quite the substance—people are inclined to 
suppose.  What is it then—this misunderstanding which is always 
possible?  It must be considered not just a negative thing (like a rainy 
day, even if it rains everyday), something which afflicts our speech-
acts like a bad patch (or like a storm around a shelter), but rather, as 
Derrida says, “its internal and positive condition of their possibility.”3 
Derrida depicts Austin’s failure like this.  Austin doesn’t 
 
                                                          
 1 JACQUES DERRIDA, Signature Event Context, in LIMITED INC, 17 (Samuel Webber & 
Jeffrey Mehlman trans., 1988). 
 2 Id. at 15. 
 3 Id. at 17 (emphasis added). 
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“interrogate[] as an essential predicate or as a law”4 those risks of 
infelicity to which he has described speech as everywhere exposed.  
Instead he puts those risks on the outside of a “field whose organizing 
center remain[s] intention”5  That is what makes him philosophically 
exemplary: 
Austin’s procedure is rather remarkable and typical of that 
philosophical tradition with which he would like to have so few 
ties.  It consists in recognizing that the possibility of the negative 
(in this case, of infelicities) is in fact a structural possibility, that 
failure is an essential risk of the operations under consideration; 
then, in a move which is almost immediately simultaneous, in the 
name of a kind of ideal regulation, it excludes that risk as 
accidental, exterior, one which teaches us nothing about the 
linguistic phenomenon being considered.6 
The “exclusion” or “ideal regulation” of the risks arising from 
the exposure of speech (and indeed any intentional action) to 
infelicity, to the world’s ever-changing scene of circumstances is, for 
Derrida, the constitutive feature of the “metaphysical” in human 
thought.  Metaphysics is, for him, this failure to represent (or to 
“think,” he likes to say) the circumstantial—everything having to do 
with the world, the body, the sign, spatiality, the side-by-side, the 
situation of human being—as structurally integral to those mental or 
spiritual items (meanings, intentionality)  to which they are classically 
opposed.  This failure, he thinks, repeats itself over and over.  Austin 
is only a further example.  But Derrida finds Austin remarkable partly 
because this repetition of the tradition happens behind his back, 
against the grain of his philosophical talent and effort. 
Despite the considerable attention already given to this 
exchange—it is fair to say that it helped bring Derrida and (Derrida’s) 
Austin into the curriculum of literature departments—I think it is 
worth re-hearing the issue.  The charge is that Austin describes the 
standing vulnerability of speech to the risks of infelicity well enough, 
but then fails to take such risks “into account” in the right way, i.e., in 
a properly legislative, law-like, or necessity-exhibiting way.  In work 
from which I shall break-off here merely a preliminary piece, I 
suggest that this charge depends on too narrow a notion of how the 
necessity in question may be grasped or exhibited: Austin has 
exhibited it, but in what some may call a practical way.  The 
preliminary piece of this I will present here concerns the interrogative 
attitude which Derrida found missing in Austin: It concerns the nature 
and scope of Derrida’s own form of account.  And to get clearer about 
 
                                                          
 4 Id. at 15. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id.  
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this, we might, I think, do well to start with a possible 
misunderstanding of Derrida’s point, the one he is making when he 
says, emphatically, that misunderstanding is always possible. 
 
II.     THE HEARSAY VIEW 
 
[O]ur investigation, however is directed not towards phenomena, 
but, as one might say, towards the “possibilities” of phenomena.  
We remind ourselves, that is to say, of the kind of statement that 
we make about phenomena. 
–Wittgenstein7 
 
We know that a misunderstanding is possible here.  We know it, 
not just in the abstract way which Derrida speaks about—viz., 
“misunderstandings of anyone, anywhere, you know, are always 
possible” but because we see it happening.  It happens often in fact, so 
it is not surprising that Derrida often endeavors to dispel or avert it, 
the better to be understood.  The misunderstanding consists in 
thinking this, that what Derrida must be driving at here is that you 
can’t ever really decide what a text means.  Maybe this comes to the 
same thing as something else Derrida is supposed to think, namely 
that making some kind of “decision” about what a text means is all 
you can ever do—i.e., there isn’t really any truth to be had in such 
judgments, just so many different interpretations. 
Martha Nussbuam is an example of someone who reads Derrida 
in this fashion—as saying that texts have no decidable meanings 
(whatever that means).  She worries, then, that Derrida is putting “free 
play” in place of reasoned ethical commitments.8  This is how Derrida 
 
                                                          
 7 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §90 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 3d ed. 1972). 
 8 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism About Practical Reason in Literature and the Law, 
107 HARV. L REV. 714, 724-25. (1994).  “Free play,” it seems worth remarking, isn’t the only 
alternative to “reasoned” ethical commitments.  I have never reasoned my way, for example, 
into the wrongness of killing people for sport, and, in fact, I’m somewhat doubtful that the 
right way to teach this point, or to firm it up if it becomes doubtful, is to reason about it.  But it 
is an ethical commitment nonetheless.  Nussbaum, to be clear, has no special interest in 
Derrida.  He is only a recent example of someone saying what was said in a more “fully 
worked-out” and “methodologically self-conscious” way by the Pyrrhonists.  Id. at 716.  Many 
others—e.g., Stanley Fish, Richard Posner and Robert Bork—are also, for Nussbaum, modern-
day Pyrrhonists.  And in Nussbaum’s view, all such Pyrrhonisms are to be charged with 
threatening the grounds we have for respecting others or responding appropriately to their 
suffering.  We need such grounds, Nussbaum thinks, if we are to able to see our ethical 
responses as rational ones; and to have such grounds, she feels, is to have (or to apply) a theory 
of “good human functioning,” something to which Pyrrhonism, ancient or modern, is inimical.  
Id. at 717.  Something seems a little off here, because it isn’t just “Pyrrhonists” who don’t 
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or “deconstruction” gets represented, and adjudicated, in the Times 
and other places as well.  Remember, the rules against hearsay 
testimony don’t apply outside the law. 
There isn’t any one good explanation, I think, of how Derrida 
comes to be read this way, except to say generally—what Derrida has 
taught people to say—that the text here exceeds its context.  But as 
that idea characterizes any text— “iterability” or “citationality” are 
what make language, not what make commentary possible—it is of 
course uninformative.  Let’s be clear: The hearsay view isn’t an 
innovative interpretive “decision”; it is a view which arises when the 
context of Derrida’s writing goes missing completely. 
Here’s an example which suggests the kind of thing which can 
happen when the context goes missing.  It is probably too simple an 
example actually to have confused anyone, but that is its virtue—
things will get complicated soon enough.  “Misunderstandings are no 
accident, they don’t just happen now and then,” the deconstructivist 
says.  Or if he doesn’t, let us imagine someone saying that.  It is a 
natural thing to say, rather like 
(1) “It doesn’t simply happen that democratic countries hold 
elections”; or 
(2) “It is no accident that liberals support the right of free speech.” 
These are ways of saying that these things have a little more 
categorical kick to them: If you understand what kind of thing they 
are, you understand that certain predicates apply.  “Meaning” is such 
a kind too: Whenever it is present, responsive judgments are 
characterizable as either understanding—as properly informed by it—
or not.  (Meaning, as I shall put this later, has a “normative aspect”).  
As this is fairly obvious, it requires a rather special context before it 
becomes an interesting thing to say.  But take away that context 
(whatever it is) and let someone say “misunderstandings don’t just 
happen now and then.”  Then it might be felt: Whatever else could 
this mean but that “misunderstandings” happen literally all the time, 
that they always happen?  That slides us toward the hearsay view—it 
is a possible misunderstanding. 
Of course, the equivocation here is easy to hear.  Someone who 
uses the “happens” expression in the way I’ve imagined—to 
remember what kind of thing something is—isn’t really asserting or 
denying anything.  That is, in such a context, “happens” doesn’t 
                                                                                                                                  
ground ethics in a theory of “good human functioning.” Id.  Kant (and many other ethical 
rationalists—including, on some readings, Aristotle) doesn’t either.  Nussbaum alludes to some 
recent discussions of ethics by Derrida, but ignores them commenting that Nikidion (the 
fictional truth-seeking student of her essay) “feels entitled to read [the] earlier texts without the 
hindsight supplied by the new work, which seems to represent a shift in position.” Id. at 725 
n.52.  But how is Nikidion suppose to know whether Derrida has “changed position” without 
considering what he says?  And, even if he has, wasn’t Nikidion trying to find the truth? 
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function as it does in, e.g., “It doesn’t happen to rain much around 
here,” which means: it happens not to.  In (1) above, it rather isn’t a 
question of any kind of happening, one way or another.  This much is 
easy to see, but one of its implications is perhaps less so: Instead of 
saying that misunderstandings don’t just happen, someone wishing 
faithfully to express the same point could also say: “True or correct 
understandings don’t just happen; they are necessary possibilities, 
structurally speaking, wherever there is meaning.”  Now that sounds 
like the very negation of the hearsay view!  Yet the difference 
between this and “misunderstandings are always possible” is merely 
imaginary.  For that is how it is with any “possibilities” that show 
what kind of thing something is.  To take another example, it is of 
course no accident that the clerk may give you the wrong change; but 
neither is it any accident that he may get things just right.  Why 
should it even be thought challenging to say that misunderstandings 
of a text are always possible?  It would seem only to be a way of 
remembering this: that texts are the kind of thing which can be 
correctly understood. 
 
III.     THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT AND THE 
PRIORITY OF THE QUESTION 
 
That the hearsay is—in truth—a misunderstanding can be 
explained (apart from the sheer absurdity of the resulting doctrine) 
like this: What always goes missing in such a view (but in ways 
harder to see than in Section II) is just the philosophical context in 
which things like “a misunderstanding is always possible” seem to be 
worthwhile things to say.  (Say this to anyone doing any real work 
with texts—other than philosophizing—and they are apt to look at 
you blankly: “Sure, now can we get on with it—how much do I owe 
you?”)  A rather special intellectual difficulty is needed to get things 
off the ground here.  And to so much as get Derrida to speak, you’ve 
got to draw some distinctions, and say something like this.  What is at 
stake here, or put at issue, is not whether there are correct or true 
uptakes of a text (and not whether they don’t in fact occur fairly 
reliably, the mis-takes being only now-and-then), but rather: how such 
things, when they do occur, are possible.  What is at issue, then, lies 
in the nature of a sought-for account of meaning, and—as will 
emerge—in a claim about the necessity of giving such an account. 
Derrida’s acolytes call this account a “quasi-transcendental” 
one—or at least many of those who have made it beyond the hearsay 
view do.  (Not all of Derrida’s followers are—in the sense of what is 
always possible when there is meaning—following).  The 
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“transcendental” in this formula refers of course to Kant, who 
decisively turned philosophy toward such a form of questioning, one 
which seeks to discover (what both Kant and Derrida call) laws.  
What the word “quasi” adds or subtracts here is much less clear.  It 
suggests that Derrida offers such a law-like form of account only in 
some knowing or strategic way.  He doesn’t really think there’s much 
salt in this traditional philosophical project (i.e., of describing the 
possibility and limits of language, its disobedience of notional 
conditions of “purity”), but he thinks that it is a good idea to play 
along as if there were, so as to complicate the project and perhaps 
twist free of it from inside.9 
But quasi or not, wherever there are transcendental doctrines 
there is also a question which calls for this type of doctrine, and the 
question is really the primary thing, in two senses.  First, it sounds out 
on its own, even apart from the particular answers given to it (but 
not—as just seen (Section II)—the other way around).  Second, the 
question determines how the answer is to be taken, and even, as I will 
suggest, what the terms of the answer will have to mean. 
Derrida writes out of an awareness of this second point.  He 
discusses it,10 but he also applies it in his writing, for he constantly 
invents new terms—for example, differance, arche-writing.  If we ask 
why that is—why the proliferation of technical terms is such a 
pervasive feature of his style—the answer would seem to be this: 
Such terms make perspicuous (in a way that words like, say, 
“interpretation” don’t) that there is no knowing what their author is 
about apart from the philosophical question which is their context and 
in which they have been called into service.  The point of such terms 
is that they wear their uselessness outside of philosophy on their face.  
(Differance, as Derrida remarks, “is neither a word or a concept.”)11  
Of course, this is also the point which began to appear in Section II: 
address Derrida’s remarks about “always possible” to the wrong 
question and what you get is the gibberish about it being impossible 
to decide what a text means. 
Now Derrida’s question, I will suggest, is this: How is it possible 
for a text to have meaning, just as such?  The primacy of the question, 
in the first sense above, is seen in the fact that a number of different 
doctrines always come into play here.  For example, besides the 
various “deconstructive” answers (“differance,” “arche-writing,” 
“active interpretation,” “iterability” and the like), there are also 
 
                                                          
 9 See, e.g., Derrida, supra note 1, at 152, 21. 
 10 See Jacques Derrida, Differance, in SPEECH AND PHENOMENA, AND OTHER ESSAYS ON 
HUSSERL’S THEORY OF SIGNS 158-59 (David B. Allison trans., 1973). 
 11 Id. at 130. 
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doctrines like the “Platonistic” one Derrida discovers in Husserl 
(Meanings—pure mental entities of a sort). Such metaphysical 
doctrines, we are given to understand, are being criticized or 
complicated—or in some other way messed-around with—by the 
deconstructive doctrine.  And one could mention other doctrines here, 
like the so-called “pragmatic” teaching that it is an “interpretive 
community” or a “social practice” which makes it possible for a text 
to have meaning, or even the older teaching that it is Ideas in God’s 
Mind which is the ground of possibility of any sort of explanation of a 
text’s meaning.  The question is primary (in the first sense above) 
because it is the common space of these different doctrines, the way 
they speak to or oppose—or otherwise operate on—each another. 
 
IV.     GENERALIZING THE QUESTION:INTENTIONALITY, 
NON-NATURALNESS 
 
But how did I get to this— “the possibility of meaning” —when 
I began by talking about truth or correctness?  The stress on a 
misunderstanding which is “always possible,” isn’t, I said, a point 
about whether anyone ever correctly or truly understands.  Rather it is 
about the conditions under which it is possible to employ such 
terms—to assign these “values” Derrida says—in the everyday way 
we do, giving them application to some people’s uptake but not—e.g., 
Nussbaum’s or the Times—to others.  Now the connection between 
these two matters—truth or correctness, on the one hand, and meaning 
on the other—lies in this, that meaning has a normative aspect.  The 
point can be developed like this.  Whenever there is anything which 
means something—let’s call any bearer of meaning a “text”—then 
there are always other, spacio-temporally separated things—let’s call 
them “responses” (explanations, exemplifications, glosses, 
followings, applications, observations, etc.)—which stand in the 
following relation to the text: The responses are either in accord with 
the text or not, either correct ways of responding (going on, taking 
things up) or not.  This normative relation to further happenings or 
bits of linguistic behavior is just what distinguishes any sign which 
has meaning from random scribbles (noises or marks) which don’t: 
meanings sort things out.  There is no such thing as a correct response 
to the mark “                     ” at least until someone gives it a meaning 
or explains how it is to be used (which can be done fairly easily); 
whereas there are correct and incorrect ways of following the Health 
Code or following Derrida’s arguments, even if correct uptake 
happens with the Code rather more reliably—thank God, or thank 
“differance” or whatever makes this possible—than with Derrida. 
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Wherever we speak of “meaning,” we will have to be able to 
make use of normative notions like “correctness” or “accord.”  And 
this is why the question of how correct uptake (or mis-take) is 
possible is part of the more general question: How is meaning 
possible?  The latter is a more generic version of many more concrete 
questions we might ask: How is correct following, illustrating, 
applying, describing, etc. possible?  Which of these more concrete 
questions we do ask depends on the context and the type of text 
involved.  For example, a typical “response” to a legal text is to 
follow or apply it.  That this is so—that the meaning of such texts is 
carried through into particular “cases”—is part of what makes them 
legal texts.  (It is no accident that the law is followed, or not followed: 
this shows what kind of thing it is.)  In the case of literary texts, the 
response to meaning obviously has a different form.  (It doesn’t just 
happen that we don’t apply literary texts: this goes to the kind of thing 
a literary text is.)12 
We can take this a step further.  This most general question (i.e., 
about the possibility of signification or textual meaning) can itself be 
seen as a version of an even more general question.  There doesn’t 
seem to be a natural term in English for posing this more general 
question, but it is easy to see roughly what the question should be 
when one considers—something Austin and Derrida (and 
Wittgenstein) were especially interested in—that speaking and writing 
(writing in what Derrida calls the classical or narrow sense)13 are 
generally activities, things people do for different reasons.14  Derrida 
sometimes uses the word “intentionality” to describe this more 
generic topic to which the question about the possibility of “meaning” 
would belong.15 He also speaks of “nonnaturalness” as the most 
general province of deconstructive questioning.16 That term is 
suggested, I think, by the following consideration.  At the time we 
think of as roughly the start of the Modern in philosophy, “nature” 
had come to refer roughly to a realm of things which could be 
understood through “laws” arrived at through behavioral 
generalizations, but from which meaning (and normative relations 
generally) were excluded.17  The realm of “non-naturalness” is thus 
 
                                                          
 12 I develop further this idea of “type of text” in my Martin Stone, On the Old Saw, “Every 
Reading of a Text is an Interpretation”: Some Comments, in THE LITERARY WITTGENSTEIN 
(John Gibson & Wolfgang Huemer eds., 2004). 
 13 Derrida, supra 1, at 9. 
 14 See Wittgenstein, supra note 7, at §§ 23-25. 
 15 Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”, 11 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 924, 931 (1990).   
 16 Derrida, supra note 1, at 136, 151.   
 17 See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, 412 (Mary 
Gregor trans. & ed., 1997). 
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the realm of judgment and action: of everything that works, as Kant 
put it, not according to law-like regularities, but according to our idea 
of laws:18 Everything involving the application of concepts or rules, 
everything (therefore) subject to a distinctively normative assessment.  
For wherever a concept is applied, we must be able to speak about a 
normative relation which is (at the start of the Modern) no longer 
conceived to exist between particulars or events found “in nature,” 
narrowly or scientifically conceived. 
 
V.     THE GENERAL QUESTION AS A QUESTION ABOUT THE TEXT 
 
By making the generality of Derrida’s question more apparent, it 
becomes possible to see that some of the chestnut philosophical 
questions like “Do we ever have knowledge of the objects around us,” 
or (later) “How is it possible to have knowledge of an object”—
questions which don’t, in their classical forms, mention any “texts”—
are really, at least in part, versions of the same general problem: the 
normative aspect of meaning and intentionality.  This is why 
“deconstructive” questioning in Derrida’s work, even when it begins 
with narrow and technical considerations about “speech acts” or 
“signs” eventually touches on all of these matters as well.  Derrida 
himself gives an explanation of the generality of deconstructive 
questioning in various places: 
What I call “text” implies all the structures called “real,” 
“economic,” “historical”, socio-institutional, in short: all possible 
referents.  Another way of recalling once again that “there is 
nothing outside the text” . . . .  [This] mean[s] that every referent, 
all reality has the structure of a differential trace, and that one 
cannot refer to this “real” except in an interpretive experience.19 
Another bit of hearsay—another possible misunderstanding—is 
of course being corrected here: viz., that Derrida believes that 
everything is a big book which doesn’t refer to anything except itself 
(whatever that would mean).  Here, as usual, avoiding gibberish 
depends on correctly locating the question.  It is not: “Do speakers 
ever make objective reference to things outside of language?  
Everyone—or at least everyone who isn’t operating under the 
influence of hearsay-deconstruction—can see that they do.  The 
question calls for a formulation like this: “How is such objective 
reference possible?” 
Of course, it might be said that some of Derrida’s ways of 
 
                                                          
 18 Id. 
 19 Derrida, supra note 1, at 148 (emphasis added). 
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answering this question—ones that have the form of, or are 
confusable with, an assertion that “there is nothing outside the text” 
—seem to be asking for rumor to spread.  Perhaps Derrida isn’t 
entirely un-ambivalent in his wish to be understood.20  For it is not 
just Derrida’s accusers, but also his followers—so he implies in this 
same passage—who have been “so naive” as to spread the “reference 
is suspended in the text” doctrine.21  Say what you like about 
misunderstanding or mishap being “always possible”: This doesn’t 
obviate—it is what makes necessary—the question of whether 
reasonable care has been taken to avoid it; was it taken here?  
Derrida’s excuse will have to be, of course, that the circumstances 
here are philosophy: you’re entitled to rely, aren’t you, on people 
having a certain preparation?  But then why talk of “naivete?”  What 
seems to be involved is a great number of people being imaginatively 
attracted to the sound of Derrida’s words and having all kinds of 
associations to them, but not having read, say, Kant, well enough to 
recognize the form of the question being asked.  Supplying that 
critical context causes the pieces to drop into place.  Talk of the 
“ubiquitous text” (with no outside) is a way of observing that our 
transactions with the world involve the same sort of normative 
assessments—the same questions concerning the correctness of 
responsive judgments—as are present with any bearer of meaning.  In 
this sense, the question “how it is possible to make objective reference 
to the world” may be said to be a version of the question “how is a 
correct understanding of a text possible.”  Since both are 
specifications of the same general question about the normative aspect 
of intentionality, the latter question (about “texts”) can stand in place 
of the former (about correctly wording the world). 
 
VI.     THE PLACE OF THE QUESTION. 
 
 
The very form of this question concerning a question—namely 
“where?, in what place can a question take place?”—supposes that 
between the question and the place, between the question of the 
question and the question of the place, there be a sort of implicit 
contract, a supposed affinity, as if a question should always be first 
authorized by a place, legitimated in advance by a determined 
space that makes it both rightful and meaningful, thus making it 
 
                                                          
 20 But who is?  It would mean having to understand oneself. 
 21 “That does not mean that all referents are suspended, denied, or enclosed in a book, as 
people have claimed, or have been naive enough to believe and to have accused me of 
believing.”  Id. at 148. 
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possible . . . . 
According to the French idiom . . . one would say that there are 




Now to draw a few points, three sets of remarks about what has 
been said so far: 
(1) Derrida makes a point of saying that deconstructive 
questioning has no “proper place.”  What he means can be 
approached, I think, like this. 
I’ve said that Derrida’s words have, as their context, a certain 
question about how intentionality is possible: apart from this question, 
there is no understanding him, only the hearsay gibberish.  But 
Derrida wishes to say that this question itself belongs to no special 
context; it is rather a kind of self-standing question, one which people 
are fated or obliged to confront once they begin to reflect.  It has no 
conditions of possibility—no proper place, sphere, region or domain 
of operation.  This sense of the autonomy or unconditionality of 
philosophical questioning will be crucial, I think, to understanding the 
difficulties which arise in trying to align “deconstruction” with the 
ways of continuing philosophy found in Austin and (even more self-
consciously) in Wittgenstein.  For it only against the background of a 
sense of the autonomy or self-standingness of metaphysical 
philosophy (as the interrogation of “grounds of possibility”) that it 
makes sense to think that it is necessary—or in some sense 
obligatory—to deconstruct it. 
Austin’s form of philosophical elaboration is not 
deconstructive—it offers no statement of possibility and impossibility 
conditions—and that is just Derrida’s complaint: Austin does not 
interrogate those ever present risks he has described “as an essential 
predicate or law.”  But why should this seem to be a complaint?  
Derrida is making an assumption here about what the intellectual 
options are: Everyone must, willy-nilly, be depending on some 
account of how meaning is possible, so if not a deconstructive 
(whereby everyday speech which fulfills its purpose is an “effect” of 
“general writing,” or “differance,” then a more traditional 
metaphysical one (in the sense of Section I); there don’t seem to be, in 
Derrida’s view, any other options.  But why would one think so?  The 
assumption is just that of the unconditional necessity of philosophical 
 
                                                          
 22 Of the Humanities and the Philosophical Discipline: The Right to Philosophy from the 
Cosmopolitical Point of View.  [PROFESSOR, DO YOU HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS ON 
WHERE WE MIGHT FIND THIS SOURCE?] 
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questioning in this special form—the interrogation of grounds of 
possibility; it is a function of Derrida’s sense of the autonomy or self-
standingness of such philosophical questioning.  Everything in 
Derrida’s writing happens as if philosophy were intellectually and 
institutionally autonomous, invasive, insidious and unavoidable.  So if 
you don’t “deconstruct” it, you are caught up in it unawares, tertium 
non datur. 
It would be no exaggeration, I think, to say that for Wittgenstein 
anyway, philosophy in this sense doesn’t exist at all.  The question, 
for example, of how a rule-informed judgment can be simply true or 
correct only seems to exist, Wittgenstein suggests, when one tries to 
consider the use of words apart from the applications living beings 
(people engaged in the activities of speaking) make of them—to 
consider them, then, “in themselves.”  (The very notion of words 
having meaning only “on condition of ____” seems to depend on such 
a prior idea of words considered “in themselves”: It expresses a form 
of questioning from an essentially speculative standpoint, rather than 
the standpoint of agents giving their words application in the 
circumstances at hand.)  So, for Wittgenstein, it is not the “effects” of 
everyday speech which are to be exposed as departures from a 
notional condition of purity; it is the philosophical question which is 
to be exposed as an “effect” of the everyday use of words, or of a 
misunderstanding of our own agency in using words to which we are 
prone.23  The very notion of a constitutive philosophical “account” of 
meaning, for Wittgenstein, would be the expression of such a 
misunderstanding: an attempt to grasp our linguistic activities through 
an essentially speculative gaze, one which abstracts from the practical 
standpoint of the agent having concourse with texts and their 
meanings. 
These sketchy remarks are meant to indicate: (a) that it should be 
harder to bring Derrida and Austin into alignment than is commonly 
supposed (by Derrida first of all); (b) for while it is certainly possible 
to read Austin in the way Derrida does (as someone failing to 
interrogate as a philosophical law the risks of mishap to which speech 
and action are prone), it perhaps isn’t necessary to read him this way 
(it is a possible misunderstanding); and (c) the lack of necessity in 
Derrida’s reading of Austin (as someone repeating the philosophical 
tradition by failing to deconstruct it) is just the lack of necessity of 
deconstruction—accounts of conformity to, and departures from, 
notional conditions of purity—as a way of continuing philosophy. 
Has the question, which brings the emphatic “always possible” 
 
                                                          
 23 On this, see Stanley Cavell, Counter-Philosophy and the Pawn of Voice, in A PITCH OF 
PHILOSOPHY: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL EXERCISES 53-128 (1996).   
STONE.FINAL.VERSION 10/31/2005  4:51 PM 
2005] THE QUESTIONING ATTITUDE  625 
into Derrida’s answer, and then interrogates it as a law, really no 
place?  We know that it does not everywhere have the same felt 
urgency.  Indeed, by locating the generality of the question, we get a 
feeling for just where it does break out: not of course essentially with 
post-structuralism or anything coming to the party as late as that, but 
roughly at the start of the Modern in philosophy.  It is here—as 
Cartesian doubt, for example—that the question of whether one can 
know anything about the world arises.  It is the “scandalous” question 
which Kant reframes as one concerning the conditions of possibility 
of such knowledge.  Could we not interrogate the place of that 
question—its conditions of possibility—like this: What has happened 
to suggest that such “non-natural” episodes as “knowing” something – 
episodes of concept or rule-informed judgment—are, in fact, 
impossible?  The non-natural phenomena in question are, after all, 
“the most common thing in the world,” as Derrida remarks.24  Can the 
demand for a philosophical account here stand intelligibly or naturally 
on its own, apart from something happening in our thinking to suggest 
that such everyday phenomena—the effects of a successful signature, 
for example25—must really, after all, not be possible?26 
(2)  Notice how far we have come from the hearsay view.  We 
begin by putting Derrida’s remarks in the context of the right 
question—not whether there can be correct or true understandings of a 
text, but the conditions of the possibility of such “non-natural” 
phenomena.  But has this really managed to clear anything up?  Are 
we really now simply to say: “Oh, I see, what Derrida says is not what 
Nussbaum has him saying—that a text has no decidable meaning—
but only that ‘it is always possible that it has no decidable meaning’; 
that’s a quasi-transcendental point, you know.”  To leave it at that 
would be to treat this sort of questioning—in terms of conditions of 
possibility and impossibility—as if it had no place, as if it were self-
standing, or as if such speculative demands did not themselves require 
explanation or critique.  What emerges here, once we begin to get 
clear of the hearsay view, only begins to make apparent a difficulty 
we are bound to feel in reading Derrida – not Nussbaum’s difficulty, 
to be sure, yet one capable of causing us no less intellectual 
discomfort. 
This suggests a deeper account of why the hearsay view arises, at 
least among intelligent readers like Nussbaum.  In failing to read 
Derrida as engaged in “quasi-transcendental discourse,” they are 
 
                                                          
 24 Derrida, supra note 1, at 20. 
 25 Id. 
 26 John McDowell has some illuminating things to suggest about the sources of this 
thought in Mind and World.  JOHN MCDOWELL, MIND AND WORLD (1994). 
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choosing what to them seems like the lesser of two difficulties.  
Here’s an illustration.  Suppose we have overcome the hearsay by 
refocusing attention on such key, context-indicating terms as 
“conditions of possibility.”  This implies other contrasts.  For, as was 
said, whenever someone says that correct understanding of a text is 
possible only under such-and-such conditions, it is implied that the 
text itself (the text apart from the relevant conditions) doesn’t 
determine how it is to be understood or followed.  And this gets said 
too.27  But what is this entity, “the text itself”?  Well, we talk about 
“texts themselves” all the time, don’t we?  In the law, for example, 
this expression means a text as opposed to some gloss which someone 
has put on it.  But that is obviously not how the term is being used in 
quasi-transcendental discourse.  (Have we forgotten once more the 
context given by the question?)  For a “text itself,” for the lawyer, is 
something which means something, hence which can be correctly 
understood—indeed, it is even sometimes said to be clearer than the 
glosses people put on it.  In short, the everyday “text itself” is 
something which enters into normative relations with people’s 
responses or uptake, but the philosophical or quasi-transcendental 
“text itself” is something normatively inert—the conditions aren’t yet 
there for it to mean anything.  So what is this “text itself”?  Perhaps 
we were only imagining that we understood what this meant—on 
account of the resonance this expression carries with the use of the 
same words in everyday contexts with which we are already familiar. 
One can repeat this sort of problem for all the other terms which 
arise in the quasi-transcendental context.  When Derrida says, for 
example, that an “interpretation” is required in every case of legal 
rule-informed judgment (interpretation as condition of impossibility 
and possibility),28 what do we understand this to mean?  Derrida 
seems to be counting on our familiarity with this term.  But when we 
remember the contexts in which we do speak of interpretation (the 
contexts in which we became familiar with the word), it appears that 
interpretations are explanations which involve the production of 
another meaning-bearing “text.”  Clearly, Derrida could not be saying 
that such explanation—a rider attached to the rule—is needed in every 
case; if it were, we should need an endless number of such 
explanations before an applicative judgment could be made.  Were we 
merely imagining that we knew what an “interpretation” is in this 
quasi-transcendental context?  (Had we forgotten the context, and 
associated Derrida’s words with their use in contexts we are more 
familiar with?)  To explain what an interpretation is—when it is 
 
                                                          
 27 “[T]he thing itself always escapes.”  DERRIDA, supra note 10 at 104. 
 28 Derrida, supra note 15 at [PLEASE PROVIDE A PIN CITE] 
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pressed into philosophical service of this kind (as a “possibility 
condition” of rule-informed judgment)—we shall need other terms; 
and eventually, in Derrida, one gets to terms like differance—terms 
which insist on, and do not let us mistake the question, if only 
because, as I have remarked, they display their uselessness outside the 
“quasi-transcendental” context on their face.  The hearsay view will 
always be cast in terms such as “interpretation” or “decidability”—
just because we seem to be familiar with these.  But we only seem to 
be: “differance” and the like are there to set us straight.  
Derrida seems to have had this idea from the beginning: 
Deconstruction is necessary because the metaphysical question has no 
place; it stands on its own.  Philosophy is a kind of self-standing 
context: here, apparently, it is significant to ask whether there is a 
“stability [in non-natural things] that is absolute eternal, intangible, 
natural”—to deny that “the ties between words concepts and things, 
truth and reference are absolutely and purely guaranteed,” or to query 
whether a context is ever “absolutely solid, or purely identical to 
itself.”29  Shouldn’t the answer to these questions be, “Let’s look and 
see”?  Derrida seems untroubled by the thought that our grasp of any 
of the words he uses here might be purely imaginary, a matter of 
associations to contexts—not engaging philosophy’s interrogative 
attitude—in which these words are doing a different kind of work.  
Would it be farfetched to suggest that it doesn’t just happen that 
Derrida isn’t troubled by this, that it rather belongs to his very 
signature: If he did question this attitude of speculative interrogation, 
or admitted forms of philosophical elaboration which didn’t preserve 
the structure of the “how possible” question, he wouldn’t be Derrida. 
(3) Or would he?  In a talk given by Derrida here (at Benjamin 
N. Cardozo School of Law), we find this: 
[I]t was normal, foreseeable, desirable that studies of 
deconstructive style[30]  should culminate in the problematic of 
law (droit), of law and justice. . . .  [A] deconstructive 
interrogation that starts, as this one did, by destabilizing, 
complicating, or bringing out the paradoxes of values like those of 
the proper and of property in all their registers, of the subject, and 
so of the responsible subject, of the subject of law (droit) and the 
subject of morality, of the juridical or moral person, of 
intentionality, etc., and of all that follows from these, such a 
deconstructive line of questioning is through and through a 
problematization of law and justice.  A problematization of the 
foundations of law, morality and politics. This questioning of 
 
                                                          
 29 Derrida, supra note 1, at 151. 
 30 I think the meaning of this is “studies conducted in the deconstructive style,” though the 
study of that style itself needn’t be excluded by this. 
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foundations . . . does [not] pass up opportunities to put into 
question or even to exceed the possibility or the ultimate necessity 
of questioning, of the questioning form of thought, interrogating 
without assurance or prejudice the very history of the question and 
of its philosophical authority.  For there is an authority—and so a 
legitimate force in the questioning form of which one might ask 
oneself whence it derives such great force in our tradition. 
If, hypothetically, it had a proper place, which is precisely what 
cannot be the case, such a deconstructive “questioning” . . . would 
be more at home in law schools . . . than in philosophy 
departments and much more than in the literature departments 
where it has often been thought to belong.31 
This passage is remarkable in several ways.  First, it seems to 
represent, as “the culmination” of a line of thought, a question which, 
given a slightly different philosophical training (one moving through 
Wittgenstein)32 would have been heard as there (i.e., as missing) from 
the beginning: What is the place of the interrogative attitude –the 
“pondering”—which Derrida finds missing in Austin?  What exactly 
is supposed to make the sophistication which defines the 
deconstructive style compulsory?  What sort of imperative is it?  
(Deconstruction is, in effect, a teaching about naivete and 
sophistication; the failure to interrogate things in terms of their 
conditions of possibility makes one naive, like Austin; a 
deconstructionist apparently can’t be too sophisticated—or can they 
now?) 
Second, this passage raises the question of what a law school and 
what a literature department are, such that deconstructive questioning 
should be at home—have its “place”—much more in one rather than 
the other.  I take this to mean: What kinds of things are law and 
literature, such that this interrogative attitude would be belong much 
more to the law?  Surely the answer must have something to do with 
this, that with the law, there is a practical aspect, which consists in the 
endeavor always to carry meaning through into the particular case, a 
set of circumstances here and now.  Not all legal interpretation is 
applicative, of course, but there wouldn’t be any such thing as 
interpreting the law if the law was not to be applied or followed.  And 
because law is just this kind of thing—a text to be followed—it needs 
 
                                                          
 31 Derrida, supra note15, at 929, 931. 
 32 Readers of Philosophical Investigations will know that the necessity or authority of 
what Derrida thinks of as “the philosophical question” is under critical examination.  See, e.g., 
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 7, at §428: “Thought does not strike us as mysterious while we are 
thinking, but only when we say, as it were retrospectively: ‘How was that possible?’  How was 
it possible for thought to deal with the very object itself?”  See Martin Stone, Wittgenstein on 
Deconstruction, in THE NEW WITTGENSTEIN (Alice Crary & Rupert Read eds., 2000) 
(discussing Wittgenstein in relation to “deconstruction”). 
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to be understood and explained in distinctive ways as well.  While the 
chain of substitutions in “literary interpretation” is in principle endless 
(for there is nothing to be called “following a work of literature” in a 
parallel sense) the interpretation of the law is either sometimes 
superfluous (when judgment is clear under the circumstances), or it 
comes to an end when things are made clear, authoritatively 
“decided.”  In short, the legal text sometimes fulfils its practical 
purpose. So that it is precisely not the case, one might say, from 
within such a practical orientation, that it is always possible for the 
legal text to mean something else.  That this isn’t always possible —
that it may not be possible even to make intelligible, here and now, 
how the law could mean anything else—shows what kind of thing the 
law is. 
This will bring us back to Austin.  For notwithstanding that it 
was to literature departments that the present strand of Derrida’s work 
succeeded in making Austin known, Austin everywhere displays a 
great intimacy with the law.  Indeed, I would want to suggest that 
what Derrida hears as a failure of a sufficiently profound interrogative 
attitude in Austin might be heard quite differently: as a different sort 
of resistance to the metaphysics of presence, one which consists in a 
form of philosophical representation adhering to an essentially 
practical standpoint—which in Austin’s language is to say, the 
standpoint of what we (first personally, as agents) say when (under the 
circumstances which are the settings of any practical agency).  But I 
mentioned that I would only discuss some preliminaries here.  This 
remains for another place. 
 
